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I.

INTRODUCTION

"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,"1 the Supreme Court
has said. Courts must therefore clearly delineate the rights, liberties, and other

*
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1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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constitutional protections that they recognize. Doing so requires carefully
defining the term right and other concepts referring to constitutional protection.
Despite this need for clarity, the Supreme Court has used right with many
different meanings. For example, in the "'woman's exercise of the right to
choose,' 2 the term implies a freedom to do something; in "[t]he right not to be
discriminated against based on one's race,"3 it implies that someone cannot do
somethin; and in "'the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of
search,'
the term implies a broad category of constitutional interests. Using
right without a clear meaning not only confuses legal doctrine but also obscures
the nature of constitutional rights. In response, this Article provides an analytical
framework designed to resolve such ambiguity and uses that framework to
clarify the nature of constitutional rights.
The analytical framework offered here elaborates on Professor Wesley
Hohfeld's "canonical" theory about legal rights developed in 1913. 5 He
famously noted, "[T]he word 'right' is used.., indiscriminately to denote any
sort of legal advantage, whether claim, privilege, power, or immunity." 6 By the
twenty-first century, Hohfeldian analysis had become an uncontroversial and
widely used theory in private law scholarship.7 Legal scholars had generally
assumed, however, that constitutional law fell outside its scope.8 Recently, that

2.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
3.
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005).
4.
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 575 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
5.
David Kennedy, Wesley Hohfeld, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 45, 51
(David Kennedy & William W. Fisher Ill eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE CANON]. For Hohfeld's
seminal work, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions], and Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions]. These articles were reprinted in WESLEY NEwcOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED 1N JUDICIAL REASONING 23 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919).
This Article cites to this book.
6.
HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 71.
7.
See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 51 (deeming Hohfeld's article "canonical"); see also
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 115 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,dissenting)
(mentioning "the familiar Hohfeldian terminology").
8.
See John Harrison, The ConstitutionalOrigins and Implications of JudicialReview, 84
VA. L. REv. 333, 340 (1998) (calling Hohfeld "a theorist of private law"). David Kennedy and
William Fisher, III, review the secondary literature about Hohfeld's theory in The Canon on
American Legal Thought. See THE CANON, supra note 5, bibliog. at 52-54. Their account indicates
that from the 1910s through the 1930s, scholars extensively applied Hohfeld's theory to common
law topics. See id. at 52-53 (citing Walter Wheeler Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the
Struggle for Life, 27 YALE L.J. 779 (1918); Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of
the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169 (1917)). Furthermore, their account shows that
when the Critical Legal Studies movement revived Hohfeld's theory after the Second World War,
scholars continued to confine Hohfeldian analysis to common law topics. See id.at 53 (citing
Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and ContractEfficient, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
711 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
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assumption may have begun to change. Scholars are now invoking Hohfeld with
surprising frequency in discussing constitutional issues. 9 They are doing so,
however, without tackling the essential question of how Hohfeldian analysis,
although intended and long understood to clarify only private law, can sensibly
apply to constitutional law. 10 This Article answers that question and thereby
lights the way for broader and more effective use of Hohfeldian analysis.
Part II explains and further develops the theory and operation of Hohfeldian
analysis, providing the foundation necessary to apply Hohfeldian analysis to
constitutional law. Part III then demonstrates Hohfeldian analysis of
constitutional law and tries to clarify the nature of constitutional rights.

1685 (1976)). However, Kennedy and Fisher never mention any scholarship applying Hohfeldian
analysis to constitutional law. See id. at 52-54.
9.
See, e.g., Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate,60 STAN. L.
REV. 1135, 1140 n.8 (2008) (citing Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions, supra note 5)
(applying Hohfeld's framework to the right to procreate); Samuel C. Rickless, The Right to Privacy
Unveiled, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 773, 775-79 (2007); Frederick Schauer, Hohfeld's First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 914, 914 (2008) (applying Hohfeld's framework to the First
Amendment); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-Extant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L.
REv. 227, 232 (2008) (applying Hohfeld's framework to legislation enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause); Gordon G. Young, Justifying Motive Analysis in Judicial Review, 17 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 191, 256-57 (2008) (citing Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra
note 5; Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 5) (stating that the U.S.
government possesses Hohfeldian rights but not constitutional rights). Before these, very few
articles applied Hohfeldian analysis to constitutional law. See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties
with the FirstAmendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48
VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1547-48 (1995) (applying Hohfeld's framework to the allocation and
reservation of powers set forth in the Constitution); Gregory E. Maggs, Innovation in Constitutional
Law: The Right to Education and the Tricks of the Trade, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1038, 1048-49 (1992)
(considering the application of Hohfeld's framework to the First Amendment to derive the
constitutional right of education); William T. Mayton, "Buying-Up Speech ": Active Government
and the Terms of the First and FourteenthAmendments, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 373, 373
(1994) (citing Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions, supra note 5) (applying Hohfeld's
framework to the constitutional right of free speech); Simeon C.R. McIntosh, On Reading the Ninth
Amendment: A Reply to Raoul Berger, 28 HOw. L.J. 913, 921-22 (1985) (citing Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 5) (applying Hohfeld's framework to the Ninth
Amendment).
10. Only one other scholar has tried to answer this question. See H. Newcomb Morse,
Applying the Hohfeld System to Constitutional Analysis, 9 WHITTIER L. REv. 639 (1988)
[hereinafter Morse, Applying the Hohfeld System]; H. Newcomb Morse, The Hohfeldian Approach
to Constitutional Cases, 9 AKRON L. REv. 1 (1975); H. Newcomb Morse, The Hohfeldian Place of
Power in ConstitutionalCases, 7 CAP. U. L. REv. 397 (1978); H. Newcomb Morse, The Hohfeldian
Place of Right in Constitutional Cases, 6 CAP. U. L. REv. 1 (1976). Professor Morse applied
Hohfeldian analysis to constitutional law based on the Constitution's use of specific terms that were
later used by Hohfeld. See Morse, Applying the Hohfeld System, supra, at 639-40 (showing "a
nexus between Hohfeldian logic and constitutional construction" based on the Constitution's use of
"Hohfeldian gravamen terms-rights, privileges, powers and immunities"). This Article provides a
better approach, applying Hohfeldian analysis to constitutional law based on the conceptual
structure underlying both.
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Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was a professor at Stanford University and later
Yale University who published only a few articles before his premature death in
1918.11 His most famous article, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, became a canonical landmark in American
jurisprudence. For more than a decade after its publication, legal scholars
12
vigorously debated the article's implications for jurisprudence and private law.
The resulting body of literature has been called the "Hohfeldian debate. 13 Since
then, private law scholars have continued drawing on Hohfeldian analysis-for
instance, with the familiar "bundle of rights" metaphor in property law. 14 Also,
moral and legal philosophers have commonly invoked Hohfeld in discussing
general theories of rights.1615 In short, Hohfeldian analysis "has become a staple of
academic legal culture."
The first two subparts below set forth basic Hohfeldian analysis. Part II.A
explains how it operates, and Part II.B shows how it can clarify legal issues. The
other two subparts further develop Hohfeldian analysis in two ways. Part IJ.C
clarifies its conceptual structure, and Part II.D explains why it can describe
constitutional law.
A.

The FundamentalConcepts

Hohfeld observed that important legal terms, including right and duty, had
no agreed meaning and thereby caused muddled analysis. Professor Karl
Llewellyn remarked that "[t]his invites confusion, it makes bad logic almost
inevitable, it makes clear statement of clear thought difficult, it makes clear
thought itself improbable. 18 In particular, Hohfeld noted four different
meanings of the term right.19 To resolve such ambiguity, he identified eight

11. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 47.
12. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefrom
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 989 n.22 (citing sixty-six sources about "the legal
rights debate" published after Hohfeld's article).
13. Id.at 989.
14. See Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle ofRights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 252-53
(2007).
15. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 199 (1980) (using
Hohfeld's framework to discuss "human rights"); Matthew H. Kramer, Introduction to A DEBATE
OVER RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES 1, 2 (1998) (noting that the authors of essays in the book
use the framework developed by Hohfeld to discuss the nature of moral rights); JUDITH JARVIS
THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 39 (1990) (citing HOHFELD, supra note 5) (using Hohfeld's
framework to discuss "the moral significance" of rights).
16. Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 8, at 751.
17. Curtis Nyquist, Teaching Wesley Hohfeld's Theory of Legal Relations, 52 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 238, 239 (2002).
18. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 84 (1960).
19. See HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 36-37, 71.
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"fundamental" concepts that allow one to describe any legal position. These
concepts are duty, claim, liberty (or privilege), no-claim, power, liability,
disability, and immunity. 21 Hohfeld explained how these concepts logically
relate to one another through correlation and opposition.22 These concepts and
the analytical framework arising from them are best explained using hypothetical
examples.
Suppose Abe and Ben make a contract with one another in which Abe
promises to pay Ben ten dollars, and in exchange, Ben promises to mow Abe's
lawn. Because the contract says that Ben must mow Abe's lawn, Ben has a duty.
Abe, in turn, has a claim against Ben. Specifically, Abe has a claim that Ben
mow his lawn. Abe's claim and Ben's duty correlate. This means that Abe's
claim entails Ben's duty. The two concepts of claim and duty correlate because
they describe two sides of one relationship, just as "parent" and "child" go
together because they describe two sides of one relationship. This relationship
may be expressed as "Ben shall mow the lawn for Abe."
Assuming that Ben never promised to water Abe's plants, Ben does not have
a duty to water them. He thus has a liberty not to water Abe's plants.23 Duty and
liberty are opposite concepts in that one negates the other. In other words,
where someone lacks a duty to perform some action, that person has a liberty not
to perform the action. 25 The relationship arising from Ben's liberty may be
expressed as "Ben may decline to water the plants for Abe." In this situation,
what concept describes Abe's legal position relative to Ben? Because Ben lacks
a duty to water Abe's plants, Abe must lack a claim that Ben water his plants.
Because no term existed to describe Abe's position, Hohfeld invented one that
seemed to make sense.2 6 This Article uses the term no-claim.27 Thus, Ben's
liberty not to water the plants correlates with Abe's no-claim that Ben water his
plants.

20. Id. at 36.
21. Id. at 36-38.
22. Id. at 36.
23. This Article uses the term liberty rather than privilege. For an analysis of these terms, see
generally Glanville Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1129, 1131-35
(1956) ("In the present discussion, the concept of absence of duty is being expressed by
'liberty' ... instead of Hohfeld's 'privilege."'). See also HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 42 ("A 'liberty'
considered as a legal relation (or 'right' in the loose and generic sense of that term) must mean, if it
have any definite content at all, precisely the same thing as privilege .... "). While liberty and
privilege "occupy the same structural position" in Hohfeld's theory, "[t]he usual distinction is that
liberties are acts that are completely unregulated and privileges are exceptions to generally imposed
duties." Singer, supra note 12, at 987 n.14.
24. See HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 38.
25. See id. at 39.
26. See id. at 38-39 (adopting the term no-right).
27. Rather than using Hohfeld's terms right and no-right, this Article uses the terms claim
and no-claim. Hohfeld himself observed that right carried a broader, popular connotation and a
narrower, technical denotation. Id. at 36. Because the broader, popular usage seems to predominate
today, this Article has abandoned the narrower, technical one to avoid confusion. Hohfeld foresaw
this possibility and sanctioned the choice of claim to indicate the term rightused narrowly. Id. at 38.
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The discussion thus far has identified four concepts and illustrated how they
interrelate by correlation and opposition. The following diagram shows these
concepts' interrelation:

Correlatives

Opposites

Duty

Claim

Liberty

No-claim

Holifeld observed that people often confused the distinction between claim
and liberty.28 Indeed, Professor Joseph Singer said that clarifying this distinction
was Hohfeld's "central goal."29 In particular, Hohfeld was concerned with the
tendency to believe that a person's liberty entails a claim that other people not
interfere with the exercise of that liberty.30 Professor Glanville Williams
provided the following clarification:
You and I are walking together when we see a gold watch lying in front
of us. I have a liberty to run forward and pick it up.... But you may run
faster than I and pick it up first; this will de facto be an interference with
me in the exercise of my liberty, but will not be a tort or other legal
wrong to me. My liberty
is a bare liberty unsupported by a [claim] in
31
this particular respect.
As Williams's example implies, one may distinguish between claim and
liberty by determining whether interfering with the concept's protection violates

28. Id. at 39 (using the terms right andprivilege instead of claim and liberty).
29. Singer, supra note 12, at 987.
30. HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 43 ("[A] privilege or liberty to deal with others at will might
very conceivably exist without any peculiar concomitant rights against 'third parties' as regards
certain kinds of interference.... The only correlative logically implied by the privileges or liberties
in question are the 'no-rights' of 'third parties.' It would therefore be a non sequitur to conclude
from the mere existence of such liberties that 'third parties' are under a duty not to interfere, etc.").
31. Williams, supra note 23, at 1143-44. This example calls to mind a classic case of
property law, Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). Post was hunting a fox using hounds
and had almost caught it when Pierson arrived and interfered by catching and killing the fox before
Post could. Id. at 175. The court found that Pierson's interference was permissible. Id.at 179. Post
thus had a liberty to kill the fox but did not have a claim that Pierson not kill the fox before him. See
id. If Post had such a claim, then Pierson would have violated the correlative duty.
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a duty. This approach works because claims always correlate with duties, but
liberties never do.33
The four concepts discussed thus far share the characteristic of concerning
only actual physical behavior or primary conduct.34 They may thus be called
primary concepts. These concepts describe situations where the law forbids,
permits, or requires physical actions or inactions. The remaining four concepts
do not share this characteristic and may be called secondary concepts. Unlike the
first four, these concepts relate to whether by doing certain actions a person
changes the law. To illustrate, whereas primary concepts describe whether a
couple may stand before a priest and say "I do," secondary concepts describe
whether by doing this the couple creates a legal marriage. Primary concepts
describe whether a person may utter the words "I promise to mow your lawn,"
but secondary concepts describe whether by uttering those words the person
creates a legal duty.
The four secondary concepts interrelate just like the primary ones.35 Recall
Abe and Ben's contract mentioned above. Before making the contract, Ben had a
power to create his duty to mow Abe's lawn. He exercised this power by
accepting Abe's offer to pay ten dollars in exchange for Ben's promise to mow
the lawn. Because Ben's duty correlated with Abe's claim, Ben also had a power
to create Abe's claim by accepting the offer. In turn, Abe was liable or subject to
Ben changing Abe's legal position from no-claim to claim. Abe thus had a
liability that correlated with Ben's power.
Suppose Ben wants to create for Abe a duty to steal a car, but the state in
which Ben and Abe live does not allow such a contract. While Ben may want
Abe to promise to steal a car in exchange for Ben's promise to mow Abe's lawn,
Ben lacks the power to make this arrangement a legal contract. Ben thus has a
disability to create the desired duty for Abe. Disability and power are opposite
concepts-like liberty and duty. 36 Because Ben has a disability to create a duty
for Abe to commit a crime, Abe cannot have a liability to Ben creating this duty
for him. Abe thus has an immunity from Ben creating the duty. The following
diagram illustrates how the secondary concepts interrelate:

32. See Williams, supra note 23, at 1143-44.
33. See HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 36.
34. Cf Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (holding that on habeas review "a new
[constitutional] rule should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe' (quoting
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971))).
35. HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 36.
36. Id.
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Correlatives

K->

Opposites

Power

Liability

Disability

Immunity

These eight concepts are the heart of Hohfeldian analysis. 37 They allow one
to describe any legal position that a person can occupy.38 Hohfeld remarked, "If
a homely metaphor be permitted, these eight conceptions ...
seem to be what
39
may be called 'the lowest common denominators of the law.'
B. Application to CaseAnalysis
Using Hohfeld's framework, one can identify and define people's relative
positions under the law and the legal issues involved in any dispute. In
particular, Hohfeldian scholars have observed that a judge deciding a case must
4
determine which Hohfeldian concept describes each litigant's relative position. 0
The following two sections illustrate this point using actual cases that are
paradigmatic of private law.
41
1. O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co.

Mar O'Brien was a passenger aboard a steamship from Queenstown to
Boston. As the ship neared Boston, a physician began vaccinating the
passengers. 43 O'Brien never expressly requested a vaccination, but she stood in
line with about 200 women awaiting vaccinations. 44 When her turn came,
O'Brien presented her apparently unvaccinated arm to the physician, and he
vaccinated her.45 She later sued Cunard Steam-Ship Company in the Superior
Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, alleging that Cunard's physician
assaulted her by vaccinating her against her will.4 After the Superior Court

37.
38.
30 (1921).
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id.
See Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 229HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 63-64.
See Singer, supra note 12, at 992-93.
28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891).
Id.at 266.
Id.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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found in Cunard's favor, O'Brien appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.4 7
O'Brien's allegation implies that Cunard's physician had a duty not to
vaccinate her, she had a correlative claim against vaccination, and the physician
violated his duty by giving her the vaccination. The court reasoned, however,
that "[i]f the plaintiffs behavior was such as to indicate consent on her part, he
48
was justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been."
Accordingly, while Cunard's physician may have had the mentioned duty,
O'Brien had a power to change that duty into a liberty by giving her consent.
The factual question for the court thus became whether she had exercised her
power before the moment when Cunard's physician vaccinated her.5
Finding that O'Brien had consented, the court concluded that Cunard was
not liable to pay damages.5 1 Thus, the relevant legal relation involved a liberty
and a no-claim. Cunard's physician had a liberty to vaccinate O'Brien, and
O'Brien had a no-claim against vaccination.
2.

Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co.

52

Anna Feinberg worked for the Pfeiffer Company for decades. 3 One day,
Pfeiffer's board of directors "'[r]esolved... that she be afforded the privilege of
retiring from active duty in the corporation at any time she may elect to see fit so
to do upon retirement pay of $200.00 per month, for the remainder of her
life.' 54 When Feinberg retired, Pfeiffer began sending her monthly $200 checks,
but after two changes in management, the company reduced these payments to
$100. 55 Feinberg brought an action in the Circuit Court of St. Louis, Missouri,
requesting an order for Pfeiffer to pay the amount owed. 56 After the circuit court
found in Feinberg's favor, Pfeiffer appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals. 7
Feinberg argued that, by passing the resolution, Pfeiffer's board had
58
imposed a duty on Pfeiffer to pay her $200 monthly. She would thus have a
correlative claim to those payments. Pfeiffer responded that because the
resolution did not satisfy the elements required to form a contract, Pfeiffer never
had such a duty.59 Instead, it said that Feinberg had merely been receiving $200

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.at 266.
322 S.W.2d 163 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1959).
Id.at 164.
Id.at 165.
Id.
Id.at 164.
Id.
See id. at 166-67.
See id.at 167.
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gifts. The court of appeals agreed with Pfeiffer on this question, reasoning that
while Pfeiffer had a power to contract with Feinberg, the alleged duty to pay
$200 monthly could not have resulted from the resolution because Feinberg
never gave any consideration in exchange for the promise. 61 Thus, under these
circumstances, the legal relation between Pfeiffer and Feinberg involved a liberty
and a no-claim.
The court further observed, however, that Feinberg had relied to her
detriment on Pfeiffer's Promise by stopping work at an age when she could not
easily find another job. Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, Feinberg's63
reliance effectively exercised a power to create the contract with Pfeiffer.
Viewing her behavior in this light, the court affirmed the lower court's order that
Pfeiffer pay damages to Feinberg. 64 This order created a duty for Pfeiffer and a
correlative claim for Feinberg.
C. The UnderlyingStructure
Part II.A and Part II.B above explain and demonstrate Hohfeld's original
theory. Although widely accepted, his theory leaves certain questions
unanswered. This did not prevent scholars from using Hohfeldian analysis to
clarify private law, but the conceptual structure underlying Hohfeldian analysis
must be clarified before the analytical framework may be extended to
constitutional law. Accordingly, this subpart develops Hohfeld's original theory
in three ways. Section 1 clarifies the structure of legal relations. Section 2
accounts for the principle of correlativity. Finally, section 3 explains two ways in
which Hohfeldian concepts may be deduced from one another.
1.

The Legal Relation

Claim and duty, like other pairs of correlative concepts, must go with one
another because they describe two sides of one relationship. 65 Hohfeldian
analysis calls this a legal relation.66 For example, the legal relation between Abe
and Ben may be expressed as "Ben shall mow the lawn for Abe." Although legal
relations are central to his framework, Hohfeld never discussed their basic
structure. The following observations clarify that structure.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 168-69.
See id. at 168.
Id. at 168-69.
HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 38 (quoting Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Kurtz, 37 N.E. 303,

65.
304 (id. App. 1894)).
66. Id. at 36. This Article uses legal relation rather than jural relation. Hohfeld used both
terms interchangeably. Id. at 36-38. Legal relation appears more commonly today. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (2006) ("In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the
United States... may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party .... ").
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Professor John Finnis observed that every legal relation has three
components. 67 It contains a description of conduct or behavior, which Finnis
called an "act-description." 68 A legal relation also contains two positions, each of
which may be described using a Hohfeldian concept. In the legal relation, "Ben
shall mow the lawn for Abe," for example, Ben and Abe occupy the two
positions and "mow the lawn" is the act-description. These positions may be
described by the concepts of duty and claim.
Next, Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks distinguish between concepts
describing the position of someone whom the law addresses directly and other
concepts. In the legal relation, "Ben shall mow the lawn for Abe," for example,
the law addresses Ben directly by regulating his conduct. By contrast, the law
addresses Abe only indirectly in that Abe benefits from the regulation. Duty,
liberty, power, and disability all describe the position of someone whom the law
addresses directly, whereas claim, no-claim, liability, and immunity
all describe
70
the position of someone whom the law addresses indirectly.
These observations may be combined as follows. In any legal relation, the
person whom the law addresses directly occupies one position and the person
whom the law addresses only indirectly occupies the other position. This Article
uses the term active position to describe the position occupied by someone
whom the law addresses directly and the term passive position to describe the
other position. These terms are apt because correlative Hohfeldian concepts are
like
the active and passive voices of a statement. 71 Professor Max Radin
explained:
A's [claim] and B's duty.., are not separate, however closely
connected, things at all. They are not even two aspects of the same
thing. They are two absolutely equivalent statements of the same thing.
B's duty does not follow from A's right, nor is it caused by it. B's duty
is A's right. The two terms are as identical in what they seek to describe
as the active and passive form of indicating an act; "A was murdered by
B"; or "B murdered A." The fact that A and B are wholly distinct and
separate persons must not be allowed to obscure the fact that a relation
between them is one relation and no more. 72
In summary, a legal relation's basic structure includes a description of
conduct or behavior and two complimentary positions that may be described

67. FINNIS, supra note 15, at 199.
68. Id. Another name for the act-description could be "the elements," as in "the elements that
must be proved to establish liability."
69. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 128-29 (Foundation Press 1994) (1958).

70.
71.
72.

See id.
Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1150 (1938).
Id.
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using Hohfeldian concepts. These three components are the active position, actdescription, and passive position.
2.

The Principleof Correlativity

Part II.A above described how Hohfeldian concepts correlate, but a deeper
question remains about the principle of correlativity. Where a person has a
particular duty with a certain act-description, how does one determine who has a
correlative claim? If Carl has a duty to pay Dana ten dollars, for example, who
holds a correlative claim? The intuitive answer is Dana, but suppose that she
never made a contract and instead her mother, Ella, promised to mow Carl's
lawn in exchange for Carl's promise to give Dana ten dollars. Because of Dana's
youth, moreover, only Ella can enforce the contract by suing Carl for
nonperformance. The question thus becomes more difficult.
This question parallels a philosophical debate about rights that clarifies how
Hohfeldian analysis operates. The interest or benefit theory states that a person
holds a right when and only when the right protects the person's interest or
benefits the person. 74 By contrast, the will or choice theory states that a person
holds a right when and only when the person can demand or waive its
enforcement.7 5 Although these theories address what right means philosophically
and do not directly implicate this Article, 76 the benefit theory suggests an answer
to the question of who holds a claim that correlates with a given duty. One
should consider who benefits from the duty's performance to determine who
holds a correlative claim.77
This observation is only a first step, however, because describing legal
scenarios requires a more elaborate formula. For example, although giving Dana
ten dollars may make her happy and thus please her sister, Fanny, one would not
say that Fanny holds a claim. This outcome can be avoided by including only
intended benefits. Ella elicited the promise from Carl for her own gratification
and to benefit Dana, but neither Ella nor Carl considered the sister. Thus, only

73.

See Kramer, supra note 15, at 2-5 (presenting discussions on both sides of the debate);

NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL

PHILOSOPHY 154-66 (1982) (discussing competing theories of rights in the context of children's
rights).
74. See Matthew H. Kramer, Rights Without Trimmings, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS, supra
note 15, at 61-62.
75. See id. at 64-65 ("In effect, the advocates of the Will Theory contend that rights and
claims are not equivalent. Unlike Hohfeld, they apply the label of 'rights' only to claims that are
coupled with genuine powers of enforcement/waiver on the part of the claim-holders.... A
champion of the Interest Theory..., by contrast, is happy to join Hohfeld in using 'claim' and
'right' interchangeably.").
76. See id. at 65 ("As far as Hohfeld's analytical scheme is concerned .... the difference
between the Interest Theory and the Will Theory is simply a matter of labelling.").
77. See Layman E. Allen, Some Examples of Using the Legal Relations Language in the
Legal Domain: Applied Deontic Logic, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 535, 536-37 (1998) (using a
benefit theory formula to describe correlativity between duties and claims).
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Dana and Ella would hold claims. This approach seems most intuitive and
provides an effective guide for legal analysis. Thus, the principle of correlativity
may be explained using the following formula: A person has a claim correlative
with a particular duty when and only when the duty was intended to benefit that
person.
This formula accords with how the Supreme Court has treated the concept of
right. The Court held that to enforce a federal statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,78
"a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of
federal law.,, 7 9 The Court then identified three factors to determine whether a
particular statutory provision creates a right.80 The first one states, "Congress
must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff."81
3.

Deduction of Legal Concepts

Hohfeldian analysis enhances legal reasoning by allowing one to deduce one
legal concept from another. This can be done in two different ways, although
Hohfeld only discussed one. Both are important for applying Hohfeldian
analysis to constitutional law. First, the mode of deduction that Hohfeld noted
83
arises from the principle of correlativity just explored. In short, whenever one
knows the concept that describes one position in a legal relation and the relevant
act-description, one can infer the concept that describes the other position in the
legal relation.
Second, the other mode of deduction arises from the practical implication of
certain concepts. Suppose Gus wants to contract with Hanna, but Hanna has a
disability to make binding contracts because she is a minor. Given the principle
just discussed, Hanna's disability correlates with an immunity for Gus. But
Hanna's disability also causes Gus, practically speaking, not to have the
opportunity to enter into a binding contract with Hanna. Given this implication,
Hanna's disability causes Gus to have a disability to enter a binding contract
with Hanna. One may thus deduce Gus's disability from Hanna's disability even
though the two concepts describe positions in separate legal relations.

78. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
").
79. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v.
City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)).
80. Id. at 340-41 (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous.Auth., 479 U.S.
418, 430-32 (1987)).
81. Id. at 340 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 430). Embracing the principle of correlativity, the
third factor states, "[T]he statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States."
Id.at 341.
82. See HuHFELD, supra note 5, at 38-42.
83. See id.
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D. Extension to ConstitutionalLaw
Although it became widespread in private law, scholars conspicuously
avoided using Hohfeldian analysis to describe constitutional law.8 4 One reason
may have been an assumption that Hohfeldian analysis, focusing on bilateral
relationships, cannot accommodate matters of public law involving more
complex relationships-where branches of government create and enforce legal
relations between private entities. Another reason may have been that scholars
saw an incommensurable difference between contract or tort rights and
constitutional rights designed to prevent government oppression. Whatever the
reason, this subpart explains how in theory Hohfeldian analysis can indeed
describe constitutional law. Section 1 shows the connection between Hohfeldian
analysis and an accepted distinction among legal rules, and section 2 thereby
extends Hohfeld's framework to constitutional law.
1. Primaryand Secondary Rules
Professor H.L.A. Hart famously explained law's structure in The Concept of
Law.8 5 His argument begins with an objection
to John Austin, who maintained
86
that laws are commands backed by force. Specifically, Austin believed that
laws are general, enduring, and imperative statements made by a sovereign and
backed by threats of coercive force. 87 "Stop at red lights" and "pay taxes" are
classic examples. Hart discredited Austin's theory by pointing out the
counterexample of contract law.88 Suppose that state law requires all contracts to
be signed by two witnesses, but Ike and Jen only have one witness sign their
written agreement. Although they have clearly failed to comply with the law, Ike
and Jen will not face any coercive force or punishment. Instead, they simply fail
to make a contract. To explain this outcome, Hart pointed out that contract law
differs in form from the traffic-law and tax-law examples that illustrate Austin's
theory.89 The legal rule "pay taxes" commands certain conduct and threatens
punishment, whereas the legal rule "contracts must be signed by two witnesses"
merely specifies the steps necessary to accomplish a certain legal result.
Every law takes either one form or the other. Hart called laws that take the
first form "primary" rules. 90 Under primary rules, "human beings are required to
do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not." 91 Examples

84.
85.
86.

See supranote 8.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1997).
Id. at 18-20.

87.

See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 285 (Wilfred E.

Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832).
88. HART, supra note 85, at 27-28.
89. See id.

90. Id. at 81.
91. Id.
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include "stop at red lights," "pay taxes," and "an inviter shall exercise reasonable
care toward an invitee," as well as the legal relations "Ike shall pay Jen" and
"Jen shall keep off
Ike's land." Hart called laws that take the second form
"secondary" rules.92 He explained that secondary rules "provide that human
beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary
type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence
or control their operations."9 3 Examples include rules specifying the steps
necessary to marry, to make wills or contracts, to form partnerships or
corporations, and to appoint agents.9 4 Hart also
95 indicated that rules specifying
the steps necessary to make law are secondary.
Hohfeld's eight concepts map neatly onto Hart's conceptual distinction
between primary and secondary rules. Hart's distinction leads to four possible
scenarios in law: (1) a primary rule mandates or forbids a physical act; (2) a
primary rule permits a physical act; (3) a secondary rule enables a legal act; and
(4) a secondary rule does not enable a legal act. 96 These scenarios correspond to
the four pairs of correlative concepts identified by Hohfeld. The following
diagram illustrates how:

Type of rule

Type of relation

Primary rule
binds conduct

>

Duty / Claim

Primary rule does
not bind conduct

>

Liberty / No-claim

Secondary rule
enables conduct

>

Power / Liability

Secondary rule does
not enable conduct

>

Disability / Immunity

92.

Id.

93. Id.
94. See id.at 27-28.
95. See id.at 31-32 ("If a measure before a legislative body obtains the required majority of
votes and is thus duly passed, the voters in favour of the measure have not 'obeyed' the law
requiring a majority decision nor have those who voted against it either obeyed or disobeyed it: the
same is of course true if the measure fails to obtain the required majority and so no law is passed.").
96. Cf Corbin, supra note 38, at 228 (describing the four possible predictions about law
delineated by Hohfeld's correlative pairs: that the government will or will not act against someone
and that an individual will or will not influence the government into action).
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Hart himself seemed to recognize this correspondence, stating that "[r]ules
of the first type impose duties; rules of the second type confer powers, public or
private." 97 Professor Lon Fuller explicitly recognized the connection: "The
Hohfeldian analysis discerns four basic legal relations .... [T]he basic
distinction on which the whole system is built is that between right-duty and
power-liability; this distinction coincides exactly with that taken by Hart." 98
2.

The Structure of ConstitutionalLaw

Given how Hohfeld's concepts map onto Hart's theory, the remainder of
Hart's theory shows why Hohfeldian analysis can describe constitutional law.
Hart maintained that our concept of law arises from a union of primary and
secondary rules. 99 He explained why using a thought experiment in which one

imagines a society with only primary rules. 100 Hart observed that people in this
society would encounter three distinct problems. 10 1 They would have trouble (1)
determining whether a particular rule had been recognized as binding, (2)
amending their rules to address changed circumstances, and (3) resolving
disputes about whether a person had violated a particular rule. 10 2 This society
would also lack efficient mechanisms
10 3 for determining what punishments to
impose when a person violated a rule.
Hart observed that the solution to each problem is to supplement the
society's primary rules with secondary ones. 104 To resolve the first problem, the
society would need a secondary rule to specify how to make a valid rule. 105 Hart
called this the "rule of recognition."' 06 Examples include "laws are what have
been carved on the obelisk" and the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses of
the Constitution. 10 7 To resolve the second problem, the society would need
secondary rules to10 9specify how to amend existing rules. 10 8 Hart called these
"rules of change." Examples include "the king may amend any rule by public
announcement" and the Amendment Clause. 110 To resolve the third problem, the

97. HART, supranote 85, at 81.
98. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 134 n.50 (rev. ed. 1969).
99. HART, supra note 85, at 98.
100. Id. at 91-98. To make it more feasible, assume that these rules restricted "violence, theft,
and deception," and assume that few rebelled against them. Id. at 91-92.
101. Id. at 92-94.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 93.
104. Id. at 94.
105. Id. at 94-95.
106. Id. at 94.
107. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cls. 2-3 (specifying how to make laws); see Kent Greenawalt, The
Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 621, 625-26 (1987) (applying Hart's
concept of the rule of recognition to the U.S. legal system).
108. HART, supra note 85, at 95.
109. Id.
110. U.S. CONST. art. V (specifying how to amend the Constitution).
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society would need secondary rules to specify how to determine whether a
person had broken the law and what punishment should be imposed. 1 Hart
called these "rules of adjudication."1 2 Examples include "the queen may
determine whether a rule has been violated and what punishment shall apply"
and Article III of the Constitution.!
Having shown how our concept of law requires the combination of primary
and secondary rules, Hart concluded, "[I]t is plain that we have here not only the
heart of a legal system, but a most powerful tool for the analysis of much that
has puzzled both the jurist and the political theorist."1 14 Indeed, rules of
recognition, change, and adjudication form the basic structure of constitutional
law. Given how Hohfeld's concepts map onto Hart's theory, that constitutional
law consists of primary and secondary rules entails that Hohfeldian analysis can
describe constitutional law.
One caveat must be made before going forward. This section's argument
does not require accepting Hart's positivist theory, which has115been subject 116
to
and Fuller.
criticism by scholars such as Professors Ronald Dworkin
Specifically, while this section relies on Hart's uncontroversial distinction
between primary and secondary rules, one need not accept his broader argument
separating law and morality.! 17 Indeed, the analytical framework
offered here
119
118
may coexist with the critiques of Hart's positivism by Dworkin and Fuller.

111. HART, supra note 85, at 96-97.
112. Id. at 97.
113. U.S. CONST. art. Ill (creating the Supreme Court to adjudicate certain disputes and
empowering Congress to create lower courts).
114. HART, supra note 85, at 98.
115. See RONALD DWORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 60 (1977). Dworkin maintains that
"hard cases"-cases where settled law does not clearly dictate the proper outcome-reveal the error
of positivism. Id. at 81. According to Hart's positivist theory, argues Dworkin, when a judge
decides a hard case he creates-or "legislate[s]"-a new legal rule based on considerations of
policy and then applies it to the case's facts. Id. By contrast, Dworkin maintains that a judge
deciding a hard case discerns a litigant's rights outside of positive law and then applies them to the
case's facts. Id. He concludes that by reaching beyond positive law, judges commonly and
appropriately draw upon independently existing rights to decide hard cases. See id. This would
undermine Hart's thesis that all laws are by nature positive and created according to the rule of
recognition.
116. See FULLER, supra note 98, at 133-34. Fuller agrees with calling the rule of recognition a
secondary rule, see id. at 137, but he disagrees with Hart's theory in that "Hart seems to read into
this characterization the further notion that the rule cannot contain any express or tacit provision to
the effect that the authority it confers can be withdrawn for abuses of it," id.
117. See generally HART, supra note 85, at 185 (arguing that there is no necessary connection
between morality and the validity of a law).
118. This Article's conceptual theory of rights may in two senses coexist with Dworkin's
critique of Hart's theory. For discussion of Dworkin's critique, see supra note 115. First, judges
deciding hard cases based on Dworkin's proposed criteria (indeed, according to any criteria) declare
legal relations in determining the cases' outcomes. Second, Dworkin maintains that such judges
consider "principle" rather than policy to make their decisions. DWORKiN, supra note 115, at 83-84.
He defines principle by saying that "[a]rguments of principle justify a political decision by showing
that the decision respects or secures some individual or group right." Id. at 82. Dworkin's notion of
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III. APPLICATION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Part II explained Hohfeld's framework and why it extends to constitutional
law. In turn, this part actually demonstrates Hohfeldian analysis of constitutional
law. Part III.A and Part III.B discuss the Constitution's text and four noteworthy
decisions by the Supreme Court using Hohfeldian analysis. Part III.C then
explores the nature of constitutional rights based on the foregoing discussion.
Overall, this part demonstrates how Hohfeld's framework can improve
constitutional analysis, especially as regards constitutional rights.
A. The Text
The Constitution vests sovereign power in three branches of government.
The Preamble reveals the ultimate source of authority for this: "We the People of
the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union... and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America." 12 Based on this authority, the
Constitution vests "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted" in Congress, 121 "[t]he
executive Power ... in a President,"122 and "[t]he judicial Power ... in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." 123 These vesting clauses are fundamental building
blocks of our legal system because they articulate basic rules of recognition and
adjudication. They also show how the Constitution consists mostly
124 of secondary
rules that create powers for particular branches of government.
These powers
125
correlate with liabilities for "We the People... and our Posterity.
Furthermore, express exceptions to the vesting clauses and the Constitution's
failure to enumerate certain powers create disabilities
for the federal government
126
that correlate with immunities for the people.

principle may be compared with what this Article has called a rule or otherwise may be dissected

conceptually using the analytical framework developed here. Indeed, Dworkin implicitly recognized
the correlation of concepts underlying principles while discussing a particular hard case: "If the
plaintiff has a right against the defendant, then the defendant has a corresponding duty, and it is that
duty, not some new duty created in court, that justifies the award against him." Id. at 85.
119. See FULLER, supra note 98, at 134 ("Hart begins with a distinction between rules
imposing duties and rules conferring legal powers. So far there can be no complaint. The distinction
is a familiar one, especially in this country where it has served as the keystone of the Hohfeldian
analysis.").
120. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
121. Id. art. I, § 1.
122. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
123. Id. art. III, § 1.
124. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8 (describing specific powers of Congress).
125. Id.pmbl.
126. In this Article, "the people" refers to "We the People... and our Posterity." Id.
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James Madison proposed to Congress on June 8, 1789, what ultimately
became the Bill of Rights adopted in 1791. 127 In his speech to the House of
Representatives, Madison explained that "the great object in view is to limit and
qualify the powers of government, by excepting out of the grant of power those
cases in which the government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular
mode., 128 Accordingly, the Bill of Rights generally creates disabilities for the
federal government that derogate from129the initial vesting clauses and that
correlate with immunities for the people.
The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. '130 This
language regulates Congress relative to the people. Because the act-description
beginning "shall make no law" describes secondary conduct, the First
Amendment provides secondary rules that withdraw from Congress the authority
to make certain laws. Thus, the First Amendment gives Congress disabilities that
correlate with immunities for the people. Since those disabilities by practical
implication prevent Congress from creating certain duties (e.g., most
prohibitions on speech), people enjoy certain liberties (e.g., liberties to say most
things). Although the First Amendment ostensibly applies only to Congress, the
Supreme Court has applied it more broadly, including against the states.131
From 1865 to 1870, Congress proposed and the states ratified amendments
to protect the newly freed slave population from oppression by the southern
states. Congress's first step toward this objective was the Thirteenth
Amendment. Section One reads: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction. 132 This language creates a primary rule that regulates every person
relative to every other person. The Thirteenth Amendment thus gives every
person both a duty not to enslave and a claim against enslavement. Section Two

127.
(1998).

JACK

N.

RAKovE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS

168

128. James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in RAKOVE,
supranote 127, at 176; see also David P. Currie, Positive andNegative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U.

Cm. L. REV. 864, 865 (1986) ("The ratification debates and the preamble to the resolution
proposing the Bill of Rights contain repeated references confirming Madison's explanation that the
Bill of Rights was designed to protect against 'abuse of the powers of the General Government,'
and in particular to limit the powers of Congress.").

129. For example, regarding the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, see Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-06 (2004), explaining "[t]hat right is no mere procedural formality,
but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure."
130. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
131. See generally Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the FirstAmendment, 80 Nw. U. L.

REV. 1156 (1986) (contrasting the First Amendment's intended meaning with its application by
courts and scholars to the Judicial and Executive Branches).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. X1II, § 1.
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reads: "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation. ' 133 This language gives Congress a power to pass laws enforcing
Section One, which correlates with liabilities for those on whom Section One
imposes duties or claims.
The Fourteenth Amendment has a similar structure. Section One provides
rules that create legal relations between states and individuals, whereas Section
Five gives Congress the power to enforce those rules. In Section One, the Equal
Protection Clause reads: "[N]or [shall any State] deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 1 34 This language creates a primary
rule giving each state a duty not to deny a person "the equal protection of
the
135
laws," which correlates with a claim for "any person within its jurisdiction."
B. Case Law
Part III.A having outlined the Constitution's structure using Hohfeld's
theory, this subpart applies Hohfeldian analysis to decisions by the Supreme
Court interpreting the Constitution. Each section shows how Hohfeldian analysis
clarifies the legal positions involved in a particular case and uses that discussion
to clarify what right means. In particular, this subpart illustrates how Hohfeldian
analysis can clarify the Commerce Clause, federalism, and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
136
1. Perez v. United States

Alcides Perez was a "'loan shark"' who loaned money to one Miranda,
increased demands for repayment, and threatened severe violence for
nonpayment. 137 The loans were for $1,000 and $2,000 with demanded
repayments from $105 weekly to $1,000 weekly. 138 When Miranda could no
longer make the loan payments, Perez threatened him, saying at one point that
Miranda should steal to get enough money because "if he went to jail it would be
better than going to a hospital with a broken back or legs." 139 Perez was
prosecuted under a federal statute that prohibited "extortionate credit
transactions," meaning credit transactions involving "the use, or the express or
implicit threat of the use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to

133. Id. § 2.
134. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
135. Id. Notably, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments directed at the states consist
mostly of primary rules imposing duties, whereas the Bill of Rights directed at the federal
government consists mostly of secondary rules withdrawing powers. This might have interesting
implications for the doctrine of incorporation, whereby Bill of Rights provisions were
"incorporated" against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
136. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
137. Id. at 147-48.
138. Id. at 148.

139. Id.
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person, reputation, or property as a means of enforcing repayment." 140 The
statute added that extortionate credit transactions often occur in interstate
commerce and, at any rate, directly affect interstate commerce. 14 1 After the
Second Circuit affirmed Perez's conviction, he appealed to the Supreme Court
on the ground
that the statute exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce
142
Clause.
The statute provided a primary rule that gave Perez a duty not to carry out
extortionate credit transactions. Because the statute intended to protect potential
victims, Miranda had a correlative claim. Because it also intended to protect
against threats to interstate commerce, the people had a correlative claim as well.
Only the federal government had a power to enforce the statute by prosecuting
Perez for violating his duty. This prosecutorial authority included powers to
initiate criminal proceedings and to cause Perez's liability to punishment by
proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Congress had presumed to have the power to pass this statute under the
Commerce Clause, 143 which provides that "Congress shall have Power... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes. 144 This power correlates with liabilities for the people. Perez
argued that the Commerce Clause did not authorize passing the statute 145 and
thus Congress actually had a disability to pass the statute, correlative with
immunities for Perez and the people. By practical implication, Congress's
disability would imply the prosecutor's disability to initiate a criminal action and
the lower court's disability to impose punishments for violating the statute.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision to affirm Perez's
conviction for loan sharking. 146 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas reasoned
that the Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to regulate "the use of
channels of interstate.., commerce," to protect "the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce," and to regulate "activities affecting [interstate]
commerce." 147 He concluded that because Congress could have determined that
loan-sharking affected interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause148 gave
Congress the power to enact the statute under which Perez was convicted.
This discussion shows how Hohfeldian analysis may be used to describe
legal positions arising from the Constitution. In particular, Hohfeld's framework

140. Id. at 147 n.1 (quoting Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 201(a), 82
Stat. 146, 159 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 891 (2006))).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 146-47.
143. See § 201(b), 82 Stat. at 159 ("[T]he Congress determines that the provisions.., are
necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying into execution the powers of Congress to regulate
commerce .... ").
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 1-3.
145. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 149.

146. Id. at 147.
147. Id. at 150.
148. See id. at 154-55.
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clarifies how Congress's commerce power, the President's enforcement power,
and the Court's judicial power create legal relations among Perez, Miranda, and
the people. The discussion also shows a conceptual difference between
individual and collective rights. Miranda's claim was an individual right
because, for the act-description "shall not loan shark Miranda," only Miranda
occupied the passive position. 49 By contrast, the people's claim was a collective
one because1 50"shall not loan shark" aimed to benefit the whole community
collectively.
2.

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton

151

Arkansas voters amended the Arkansas Constitution in 1992 by adopting the
Term Limitation Amendment (TLA), which provided that an otherwise eligible
candidate for Congress who had already served three terms in the House of
Representatives or two terms in the Senate could not have his name on the
general election ballot. 52 Arkansas voter and taxpayer Bobbie Hill brought an
action for declaratory relief against several Arkansas public officers and

Arkansas's Democratic and Republican parties. 153 The State of Arkansas and
U.S. Term Limits, Inc., intervened as defendants.15 4 Hill alleged that the TLA
violated Article I of the U.S. Constitution, 155 which prescribes the eligibility
requirements for congressmen. 156 The Circuit Court for Pulaski County,
Arkansas, held that the TLA violated the Constitution. 157 The Arkansas Supreme
Court affirmed, and the defendants appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.1 58
Normally in electing a congressman, Arkansas citizens have a power to vote
for any candidate who meets the Constitution's requirements and whose name
appears on the general election ballot-called an "eligible candidate." They also
have a liberty to choose which candidate to vote for. In turn, eligible candidates
each have a liability to being elected that correlates with Arkansas citizens'
power to vote. Specifically, a candidate assumes the various legal positions
associated with his office (e.g., the power to make law) upon being elected and

149. The terms active position and passiveposition are defined in Part II.C.1.
150. Cf Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (noting "the common-law conception of
crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the government").
151. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
152. Id.at 783-84.
153. Id.at 784-85.
154. Id.at 785.
155. See id.
156. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."); id. art. I,
§ 3, cl. 3 ("No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and
been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of
that State for which he shall be chosen.").
157. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 785.
158. Id. at 785-86.
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sworn. Prior to being elected, anyone who meets the Constitution's requirements
can become an eligible candidate.
These legal positions changed when the TLA took effect. People who served
in Congress too often now had a disability to become eligible candidates. By
practical implication, Arkansas voters had a disability to vote for such
candidates. Whereas before Arkansas citizens could vote for any candidate
meeting the Constitution's requirements and whose name appeared on the
general election ballot, now they had a disability to vote for anyone who could
not satisfy the TLA. The question for the Court was thus whether Arkansas had
the power to enact a secondary rule creating eligibility requirements
for election
159
to Congress beyond those already provided in the Constitution.
The Court affirmed the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision striking down
the TLA." 6 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens determined that Arkansas
lacked the power to create such requirements for congressional candidates
because the Constitution's eligibility requirements displace any created by the
states. 161 This rationale relies on the Supremacy Clause, which provides that the
Constitution "shall be the supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the
Constitution... of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding., 162 Thus, the
Supremacy Clause creates a disability for Arkansas to amend the Arkansas
Constitution in any way preempted by the U.S. Constitution.
This discussion shows how Hohfeldian analysis can elucidate the legal
relations implicated by federalism and voting. This Hohfeldian analysis also
clarifies the term right. For example, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring
opinion that discusses whether Arkansas interfered with "the federal right to vote
(and the derivative right to serve if elected by majority vote) in a congressional
election." 163 This phrase "right to vote" can mean many things, including a claim
that congressmen be chosen by election and a liberty to access the polls.
However, the above Hohfeldian analysis shows that Justice Kennedy must have
been referring to the power to vote and correlative liability to being elected.
3.

Texas v. Johnson

16 4

Outside the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas,
protestors spray-yainted walls, overturned plants, and removed an American flag
from a building. 'The flag was handed to Gregory Johnson, who "doused it
with kerosene[] and set it on fire" while others "chanted: 'America, the red,

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id.at 787.
Id.at 783.
Id.at 806.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 844 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Id.at 399.
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white, and blue, we spit on you. ' 166 After the demonstration, a "witness to the
167
flag burning collected the flag's remains and buried them in his backyard." 168
Others "testified that they had been seriously offended by the flag burning."
Johnson was charged and convicted under Tex. Penal Code Ann § 42.09(a)(3),
which provided: "'A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly
desecrates ... a state or national flag.', 1 69 The statute explained: "'For purposes
of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or otherwise physically
mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons
likely to observe or discover his action.' ' 170 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals 1 reversed Johnson's conviction, and Texas appealed to the U.S. Supreme
17

Court.

The Texas statute provided a primary rule prohibiting behavior described by
the statute. This rule imposed on Johnson a duty not to desecrate the American
flag and gave correlative claims to those likely to observe or discover such
desecration. Under the First Amendment, which applied to Texas through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Texas had a disability not to make
a law abridging Johnson's freedom of speech, which gave Johnson a correlative
immunity. Invoking that immunity, Johnson argued that the Texas law violated
his "right to differ" under the First Amendment. 172 The legal question before the
Court was thus whether Johnson's behavior fell within the First Amendment's
act-description and whether
any government interest outweighed the
173
constitutional mandate.
The Court affirmed the Texas court's decision to reverse Johnson's
conviction. 174 Texas had conceded that Johnson's conduct was "expressive,"
thus implicating the Free Speech Clause,175 but maintained that suppression of
this expressive conduct was justified. 176 Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan held that neither governmental interest declared by Texas justified the
suppression. 177 He reasoned (1) that "preventing breaches of the peace ' 178 did
not justify the suppression because "[n]o reasonable onlooker would have
regarded Johnson's [conduct] ...as a direct personal insult or an invitation to
exchange fisticuffs, ' 179 and (2) that "preserving the flag as a symbol of

166. Id.
167. Id.

168. Id.
169. Id.at 400 & n.1 (quoting TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(3) (Vernon 1989)).
170. Id.(quoting § 42.09(b)).
171. Id.at 400-02.
172. Brief for Respondent at 10, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (No. 88-155).
173. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403-04.
174. Id.at 402.
175. Id.at 405 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (No. 88-155)).
176. Id.at 407.
177. Id.at 420.
178. Id. at 407.
179. Id.at 409.
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nationhood and national unity" 180 did not justify the suppression because the
"government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." 18 1 Justice Brennan adopted the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' explanation 182
that "'the right to differ is the
centerpiece of our First Amendment freedoms.'
Once again, this Hohfeldian analysis clarifies the term right. For example,
media reports described Johnson as declaring a constitutional "right to burn the
flag., 183 Here and in Justice Brennan's phrase "right to differ," the term right
must indicate a liberty because the right-bearer occupies the active position.
While Johnson did retain a liberty in some limited sense because Texas's
disability to proscribe flag burning prevents him from having a certain duty,
Hohfeldian analysis shows that the Court did not declare a liberty to bum the
American flag. Indeed, the Court recognized this very fact: "We... emphasize
that Johnson was prosecuted
'1 84 only for flag desecration-not for trespass,
disorderly conduct, or arson."
Professor Matthew Adler has made a related observation: "Constitutional
rights are rights against rules. A constitutional right protects the rights-holder
from a particular rule (a rule with the wrong predicate or history); it does not
protect a particular action of hers from all the rules under which the action
falls." 185 Hohfeldian analysis shows why. With regard to Johnson, the notion that
"constitutional rights are rights against rules" amounts to the observation that the
First Amendment gave Johnson an immunity from Texas enacting certain laws
rather than a liberty to bum an American flag.
4.

Grutter v. Bollinger'

86

Barbara Grutter was a Caucasian resident of Michigan who applied for
admission to the University of Michigan Law School. 187 She had an
undergraduate grade point average (GPA) of 3.8 and a Law School Admission
Test (LSAT) score of 161.188 The law school's admissions policy instructed
admissions officials to consider all available information about an applicant,
including her GPA and LSAT score, the quality of her personal essay, the

180. Id. at 407.
181. Id. at 414.
182. Id. at 401 (quoting Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).
183. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Back Protesters'Right to Burn the Flag, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1989, atAl.
184. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412 n.8.
185. Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1, 3 (1998) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
Significantly, Adler defined 'predicate"' in this context to mean "the act-description contained in
the rule's canonical formulation." Id. at 3 n.6.
186. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
187. Id. at 316.
188. Id.
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enthusiasm of her recommenders, and other criteria to determine her potential
contributions to the law school. 189 Aiming to "achieve that diversity which has
the potential to enrich everyone's education," the policy also instructed
admissions officers to give "substantial weight" to whether an applicant would
contribute to diversity. According to the policy, the law school was especially
committed to "racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion
of students from groups which have been historically discriminated against, like
African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, '' 191 and sought to enroll a
'critical mass' of [underrepresented] minority students ... to ensur[e] their
ability to make unique contributions to the character of the law school."'1 92 When
the law school denied Grutter admission, she brought an action against it in the
U.S. District Court, alleging that the admissions policy significantly
disadvantaged nonminority applicants and violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 193 The court granted her request for declaratory and other relief.194 The
Sixth Circuit sitting
en banc reversed this judgment, and Grutter appealed to the
195
Supreme Court.

Based on the law school's admissions policy, Grutter had a power to make
herself an eligible applicant for admission to the law school. Exercising this
power involved attending college, taking the LSAT, mailing 196
her application, and
completing the other eligibility and application requirements. Both she and the
law school had liabilities correlative with that power. Being an eligible applicant
gave Grutter a claim that the law school consider her for admission, with a
correlative duty for the law school acting through its admissions officers. The
law school also had a power to offer admission to any eligible applicant as well
as a liberty to choose which eligible applicants would receive offers. Grutter
accordingly had a correlative liability to become an admitted applicant as well as
a correlative no-claim that the law school offer her admission. Finally, acting
through its public university, Michigan had a duty not to deny Grutter equal
protection of the laws, which correlated with a claim for Grutter. The question
for the Court was whether the law school's admissions policy violated this
claim. 197

The Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision. 198 Writing for the Court,
Justice O'Connor held that the law school's admissions policy was constitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause because its consideration of race was
narrowly tailored to further the compelling government interest of "obtaining the

189. Id.at 315.
190. Id.at 315-16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. Id.at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
193. Id.at 316-17.
194. Id.at 321.
195. Id.at 321-22.
196. See id.at 315-16.
197. See id.at 322, 343.
198. Id.at 343-44.
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educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body." 199 She determined
that the use of race was narrowly tailored because the policy (1) called for an
"individualized, holistic review" of every applicant that allowed each one to
highlight his particular contributions to diversity; (2) did not unduly burden
nonminority applicants; and (3) did not make race the defining feature of an
application. 0 0
Once again, this Hohfeldian analysis clarifies the term right and other
constitutional issues. First, Grutter contains ambiguous language implying that
the case involved balancing one right against another right, which can be
confusing. Justice O'Connor mentioned the "right to select those students who
will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,' 20 1 and Justice
Kennedy's dissenting opinion mentioned the "right to classify on the basis of
race." 20 Hohfeldian analysis clarifies this ambiguity by showing that Grutter
asserted a claim (correlating with a duty for Michigan), whereas Michigan
asserted a liberty (correlating with a no-claim for Grutter).
Second, Hohfeldian analysis shows an important difference between Grutter
and Gratz v. Bollinger, 3 where the Court struck down the University of
Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy. 2°4 This policy assigned points to
eligible applicants based on certain criteria and offered admission to any eligible
applicant who received at least 100 points. 205 Because the policy instructed
206
admissions officers to award racial minority applicants an extra twenty points,
minority applicants had correlative claims that the officers award them those
extra points while nonminority applicants had no-claims for this act-description.
By contrast, the law school's admissions policy gave admissions officers duties
to give "'substantial weight"' to every applicant's potential contribution to the
law school's racial diversity, 20 7 which correlated with claims for all eligible
applicants. Thus, under the undergraduate admissions policy, minority and
nonminority applicants had opposite legal relations for the same act-description,
whereas under the law school admissions policy they had identical ones, albeit
with different amounts of benefit. This disparity may help explain why Gratz
and Grutter reached different outcomes.

199. Id. at 343.
200. See id. at 337-41.
201. Id. at 324 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978))

(internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).

204. Id. at 251.
205. Id. at 255.
206. Id.
207. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
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Finally, Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in Grutter that
mentions "'unequal or separate rights.' 208 What Hohfeldian analysis shows
about the difference between Gratz and Grutter clarifies this phrase. The Gratz
admissions policy involved separate rights and the Grutter admissions policy
involved unequal rights, given that in Grutter the "substantial weight" more
likely benefits racial minorities. Stated formally, two people have separate rights
when, for the same act-description and relative to the same person, they have
opposite legal positions; whereas two people have unequal rights when, under
the same circumstances, they have identical
legal positions but receive different
2 9
amounts of benefit from the legal relation. 0
C. The Nature of ConstitutionalRights
Part III.B demonstrated Hohfeldian anaylsis of various constitutional issues.
The discussion also showed how the Supreme Court often uses the term right
equivocally to mean different concepts. This not only confuses legal analysis but
also obscures the nature of constitutional rights. As Hohfeld remarked,
"[C]hameleon-hued words are a peril both to clear thought and to lucid
expression." 2 10 Accordingly, this subpart tries to clarify what right means and
thereby improve constitutional analysis. It identifies four narrow meanings and
one broader meaning.
Previously, this Article showed how the Constitution creates legal relations
between an individual and the government. Constitutional right can mean any
legal position relative to the government arising from the Constitution that
Hohfeldian analysis would call a claim, liberty, power, or immunity. These are
the four narrow meanings. For example, Johnson announced a constitutional
right by holding that the Free Speech 2Clause
provides an immunity from the
11
government enacting a flag burning law.
People also use the term constitutional right more broadly to mean a
collection of such legal positions. For example, the phrase "right to freedom of
speech" describes the collection of positions created by the Free Speech Clause,

208. Id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. II, § 2, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965,
660 U.N.T.S. 195).
209. Two people could theoretically have separate rights but experience equal benefits. This
would happen when, for comparable act-descriptions relative to the same person, two people receive
equal amounts of benefit from their separate legal relations with the same person. Losing arguments
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996), used this conceptual pattern. In Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. at 488, the Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas, argued that it could have separate public schools for white and
African-American children because the schools were of equal quality. In United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. at 526, the Commonwealth of Virginia argued that it could restrict the Virginia Military
Institute to males because the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership, a parallel school for
females, was of equal quality.
210. HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 35.
211. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418-20 (1989).
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and the phrase "right of privacy" encompasses many positions arising from
different clauses and policies in the Constitution.212 This broader conception of
constitutional right may be compared to that of property. Courts describe the
concept of ownership or property using the metaphor "bundle of rights,"
meaning a bundle of legal relations that concern how an owner relates to others
213
with regard to the thing owned. Likewise, constitutional right in the broader
sense may also be called a bundle of relations, meaning a bundle of relations
between an individual and the government that arise from a particular clause or
value of the Constitution.
In sum, constitutional right means a claim, liberty, power, immunity, or
bundle of relations arising from the Constitution. Seeing how this important term
may indicate one of five different concepts and knowing how to distinguish them
allow one to avoid confusion stemming from equivocations of the term right.
Hohfeldian analysis thus provides an essential tool for improving legal reasoning
about constitutional rights.
Moreover, appreciating the structure of constitutional rights helps penetrate
legal reasoning couched in abstract language. An important application of
Hohfeldian analysis has been to clarify moral and political choices that account
for particular legal rules. 214 Hohfeld criticized "the conceptualist technique
of
,,25
claiming that specific rules were implicit in highly abstract concepts.
By
showing how moral and political choices may underlie appeals to highly abstract
concepts labeled constitutionalrights, Hohfeldian analysis provides another tool
for clarifying traditional reasoning about constitutional rights.
Finally, Hohfeldian analysis suggests that our popular understanding about
rights needs a paradigm shift. Rights are not like objects that people can possess
or carry with them. Nor are they metaphysical entities floating in space between
individuals and the government. Instead, rights are positions within legal
216
relations or bundles of such relations. And these positions only have meaning

212. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965) (inferring the right of privacy
from the "penumbras" of various constitutional clauses and decisions).
213. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) ("A common idiom describes
property as a 'bundle of sticks'-a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations,
constitute property."); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (noting "one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property-right to
exclude others").
214. Singer, supra note 12, at 1056-59.
215. Id. at 1057. On this matter, Singer argues as follows:
The logic of rights is a human invention whose purpose is to preserve us from the notion
that we must make political and moral choices. To make conscious choices, it is
necessary to realize that we are making a choice. To choose wisely, we must know who
gains and who loses from the concrete legal rules and what values are thereby preserved
or undermined.
Id. at 1059.
216. HART & SACKS, supra note 69, at 128 ("In thinking about legal 'duties,' 'liberties,' and
powers,' and their respective incidents, including 'rights,' the beginning of wisdom is to
understand clearly what they are. They are not metaphysical entities, or concepts existing in the
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by reference to the broader relationship. They are like different vantage points
upon a single relationship. Llewellyn explained: "A has a right that B shall do
something... [b]ut the right has B on the other end. The right is indeed the duty,
a duty seen other end' 217
to. The relation is identical; the only difference is in the
point of observation.
IV. CONCLUSION

Nine years after Hohfeld published his famous article setting forth
Hohfeldian analysis, Professor Charles Clark explained why the theory had
prospered: "Making the discriminations called for by this system means the
difference between winning and losing cases, between decisions for the plaintiff
and decisions for the defendant., 218 Professor Walter Wheeler Cook stated that
"no more 'practical' legal work was ever done than which is found in the pages
of Hohfeld's writings." 19 He called Hohfeldian analysis "a necessary aid both in
discovering just what the problems are which confront courts and lawyers and in
finding helpful analogies which might otherwise be hidden., 220 Hohfeld thus
reached his 221
goal of providing a practical benefit to law students and
professionals.
Despite this success, however, Hohfeldian analysis has yet to be widely
adopted in constitutional law. This Article hopes to change that. By showing
how in theory and practice Hohfeld's framework can elucidate constitutional
issues, this Article invites broader and more effective Hohfeldian analysis of
constitutional law. This Article also employs Hohfeldian analysis to clarify the
nature of constitutional rights. They are not portable objects or floating
metaphysical entities but rather positions within legal relations or bundles of
such relations. This stems from something implicit in Hohfeldian analysis-that
relationships are central to constitutional law's structure and meaning.

order of nature, or anything else mysterious. They are simply characteristic positions which people
have in authoritative directive arrangements.").
217. LLEWELLYN, supra note 18, at 85 (emphasis omitted).
218. Charles E. Clark, Relations, Legal and Otherwise, 5 ILL. L.Q. 26, 26 (1922). Clark states
that Hohfeld's theory prospered because "the system has a direct relation to the problems before not
merely the student, but the lawyer and the judge, and... its cultivation brings practical results." Id.
219. Walter Wheeler Cook, Hohfeld's Contributionsto the Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721,
738 (1919).
220. Id. at 722.
221. See HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 26-27.
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